Multimarket Competition
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7146/jod.22254Keywords:
Multimarket competition, multimarket contact, mutual forbearance, competitive intensityAbstract
This article provides an introduction to multimarket competition and the research stream that examines it. Multimarket competition occurs when firms meet their competitors in multiple markets and compete with them by coordinating their strategies across those markets. In this article, we present a concise exposition of the theoretical foundations of the literature on multimarket competition and illustrate how empirical research projects are typically designed in this literature. We also provide some directions for future work in this area and discuss implications for research in organization design.References
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